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SUBJECT Interview with Dr. Cline and Mr. Levchenko

MAURY POVICH: You will be seeing it in Newsweek magazine this week and just about every other magazine. And in a tangential way, it's on the front page of every newspaper, it led our newscast last night. We're talking about spying. It has finally come out from underneath the wraps. People are defecting. Spies are getting caught, they're being tried, they're being convicted, they're being exchanged.

What is happening all of a sudden in the spy world? It seems as if John LeCarre all of a sudden has gone public.

We're going to get an overview of this, please, first from Dr. George Carver, who is a senior fellow at the Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies, and also has 26 years at the Central Intelligence Agency, a Fulbright Scholar, a doctor in political theory from Oxford.

And nice to have you with us.

A GEORGE CARVER: Always a pleasure to be here.

POVICH: Is this a phenomenon that is going on?

CARVER: Well, it's been going on for a long time. It's just you had a rash of things breaking into public. But it's a game that has existed as long as humans have been around.

POVICH: It seems, though, the pressure is on from both sides of the spectrum, both from the Communists and from us.

CARVER: Well, the pressure is on, particularly on the Communist side, because they are trying very hard to work in the

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field of high tech, they're trying very hard to get information on how Mr. Reagan, President Reagan plans to play the summit. There's a great deal of emphasis on production, particularly with a new General Secretary. And that inclines people, at times, to be careless and take risks.

POVICH: What happens, for instance, when you read a story about a CIA employee, a fellow named Howard, all of a sudden skipping the country. Apparently, there are reports that he is in Moscow. And he was giving the Russians, apparently, some high-level information about our agents.

CARVER: Well, when I read that I get very upset, because -- hindsight's always 20/20. But if Howard was that much of a sour apple -- he's entitled to a presumption of innocence until he's convicted, of course. But if he is guilty, as he appears to be, then he should have never been hired in the first place. But it's always easy to say what should or should not have been done. The tougher problem is to take the steps necessary to insure that it doesn't happen again.

POVICH: Now, apparently someone like that, even though on a low level of the -- lower levels of the CIA, apparently had information about names of double agents, for instance, that we were using.

CARVER: Well, not really. He obviously had some information because he was on deck for an assignment in Moscow and he had gone through the training that people being assigned to Moscow are gone through, and he apparently knew the identities of people whom he was going to assist, and may indeed have compromised them to the Soviet Union. And if he did, and if the United States can ever get its hands on him, I hope that he willnot get off lightly with five years in prison followed by a nice parole.

POVICH: Now let me ask you about that, because you just made mention of that. Do you feel that that plea bargain yesterday was an outrageous plea bargain on the part of the government?

CARVER: Well, I don't think it was outrageous, Maury. Personally -- I tend to have been born in the wrong century -- I would have liked to have seen Walker keel-hauled and then swung from the highest available yardarm. But you can't do that in peacetime. And the government was faced with a very sticky problem. It needed his cooperation to find out the details of how the Soviets had recruited him, how he'd contacted with them. It also...

POVICH: And the information.

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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/26 : CIA-RDP91-00587R000100230038-7

CARVER: And the information that he'd passed them, what their requirements were.

It also would much have preferred not to try this, or any, espionage case in open court. Because when you go into open court, under our legal system, which we wouldn't want to change, a defense lawyer could use the discovery process to put the government over a barrel and say, "You be nice to my client, or I'm going to bring out so much information in the public that it's going to make your bad problem even worse."

So if you can finesse that, you're better off.

POVICH: What of, for instance, what has happened in Great Britain and West Germany, the spy world? The fact that Soviets, a Soviet defector came to Great Britain, all of a sudden 25 Soviet members of the embassy there were sent home. Then the Soviet Union retaliates by sending British diplomats home. Is that -- are there pieces of a puzzle? Is this a puzzle, or are these completely separate acts going on?

CARVER: Well, the acts you've just mentioned clearly are related. The Gordievski, the senior resident in London, the head of all KGB activities in the United Kingdom, defects to the British, defects publicly. It turns out he's worked for the British for ten years. The British then send 25 of the senior people whom he identified...

POVICH: Who he's fingered.

CARVER: Whom he's fingered. The Soviets get a little miffed and they retaliate in kind by grabbing the first 25 Britons they can find and dispatching them from Moscow. That's interconnected.

Whether or not what happened in Britain and what happened in Germany are related is another and more complicated question. I can give you and your listeners one eminently plausible hypothesis showing that they are and another that's equally plausible showing that they aren't.

POVICH: The fellow that you just mentioned, Gordievski. He is considered a big fish, is he not?

CARVER: Gordievski is a very, very senior person. In fact, Gordievski and Yurchenko, the man who defected to the United States, are probably the two most senior defectors that we have had in the last 25-odd years.

POVICH: Is it not true, then, that some heads would probably roll at the KGB back home?

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CARVER: Well, if they were rolled, both literally as well as metaphorically, the last thing in the world I would want to be, or to have been, is either Mr. Gordievski or Mr. Yurchenko's direct superior or direct subordinate, because those who worked too closely with him are going to get one-way tickets to very cold gulags, where they will spend a very long time.

If Chebrikov had not been -- Chebrikov is the current head of the KGB. If he had not been Andropov's handpicked successor and had not played the role that he played in helping make Mikhail Gorbachev the General Secretary, I wouldn't bet the mortgage on his own tenure in that job. Were his head to roll, it would be a political earthquake. But I don't think that will happen. But many of his subordinates will pay with their careers, if not their lives.

POVICH: So, on balance, you think that in this latest surge of spy activities that have gone public, in terms of defections, the Soviets are in far worse shape than we are, even though we've apparently lost a CIA man to them.

CARVER: Maury, on balance, we've scored three touchdowns and sacked two Red quarterbacks. They've broken our pass defense once and scored a first down. I think, on balance, we're way ahead of the game.

POVICH: Even if you add in the Walkers?

CARVER: Even if you add in the Walkers. We have to spot them one touchdown on the Walkers, but we're still ahead on points.

POVICH: How do you score this game?

CARVER: With great difficulty. And you have to recognize that the game analogy is useful in a certain context, but dangerous in others, because it's not a game that ever has a beginning. I can't tell you I'm in the first quarter, the second quarter, the third quarter, and at the end of the fourth we add up the score, shake hands, and all go out and have a drink together. This has been going on for decades and will continue to go on for decades, and you have to sort of constantly weigh the balance and the equities.

At the moment, we have been doing rather better than the Soviets. But that's no grounds from complacency. And the very fact of the Howard and the Walker cases shows how much work we have to do internally.

POVICH: The government leads the American people to believe that our technology, our know-how, our secrets are more

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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/26 : CIA-RDP91-00587R000100230038-7

important than the Russian secrets because their technoogy is in a crude position, ours is sophisticated. If that's the case, who cares if they -- why do we want their secrets? Who cares whether we have their secrets or not?

CARVER: Well, we want not just their technology, but we want to know how advanced their technology is.

POVICH: But we've been led to believe, the public's led to believe their technology is not advanced at all, in terms of ours.

CARVER: Well, the public has been seriously misled in certain fields. I mean I find, for example, it terribly amusing that the Russians are huffing and puffing about the alleged militarization of space, or our SDI things, when they've been working in the filed of military space technology for over two decades and have gone very far in it.

POVICH: So we would still like to know how advanced they are.

CARVER: We need to know where they are. We need to know what they know about our material. We need to know what they're planning. And we need to know many other things in the intelligence field, not just with respect to the Soviet Union, that only human sources can get us.

POVICH: I read an article recently in the Manchester Guardian on what a diplomat is, and diplomacy. And the article says it's well known in the diplomatic field that a little spying is okay. I mean is that true? I mean that we expect a little spying from all diplomats.

CARVER: Well, that's like...

POVICH: I mean is there a little bit pregnant? Can you be a little bit pregnant?

CARVER: Well, I was just saying, that's like in a girls school saying that a little pregnancy is okay. I mean diplomats are sent abroad to represent their countries' affairs. Let's not forget what 19th Century Britain observed: A diplomat is a gentleman sent abroad to lie for his country.

POVICH: To lie for his country. Right.

CARVER: Now, in keeping his eyes and ears open, or hers, to pick up whatever is useful, you can call that spying. But there's a great deal of difference between that and going out and consciously breaking another country's laws to try to get

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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/26 : CIA-RDP91-00587R000100230038-7

information that that country is trying very hard to protect. And that is not a task for diplomats, that's a task for professionals.

POVICH: What have we decided here in terms of the numbers of Soviets and Russians who are here, the freedom that they have in this country? I mean do you feel that there's a sense of urgency that we should restrict diplomats' movements here in this country?

CARVER: I feel a sense of urgency about coping with a very serious problem. It's not soluble because we have an open society and don't want to change it. But every third Russian, if not every second one, works for the Soviet intelligence service, the KGB, or is a co-optee. And when they have free run of our country in a way that our diplomats and others don't have free run of theirs, we have an imbalance we have to correct.

POVICH: I thank you so much, George Carver, for being with us, from Georgetown's Center for Strategic and International studies and a 26-year veteran of the CIA. George Carver.

We're going to continue with this. We are going to meet another, I guess, colleague of yours, Ray Cline, at the CIA; as well as a man who probably knows more than any other what it is like to be a spy.

* * *

POVICH: Please welcome to Panorama -- Dr. Ray Cline is a senior associate at the Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies, formerly with the CIA for 31 years, I guess, Deputy Director for Intelligence at the CIA. If there's anyone who knows anything about the intelligence that the CIA is able to gather, Dr. Cline is one. He has a Ph.D., himself, from Harvard and he studied at Oxford as well.

And also please welcome to Panorama Stanislav Alexandrovich Levchenko, a former KGB major, who defected to the United States in 1979. He was stationed in Japan. He grew disillusioned with the cynicism of Soviet Communism. And as he saw a free society operate, his Christian moral standards were reinforced to the point where he could no longer tolerate the KGB and their activities, and he defected.

Nice to have you with us, Mr. Levchenko.

Your familiar with the Levchenko case, Dr. Cline.

RAY CLINE: I think it's a great tribute to the difference between our two societies that Mr. Levchenko came to give us

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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/26 : CIA-RDP91-00587R000100230038-7

some assistance on dealing with the very tough, unscrupulous intelligence system that the Soviet Union operates.

POVICH: Let me ask you, as I asked George Carver. Is there anything unique, what's going on now in terms of defections, in terms of Russian defections, and what is happening here in this country, when all of a sudden we seem to have more spies?

CLINE: Well, I think there are two phenomena, Maury, quite different, because we're such different societies. The change of an administration in an open society like ours doesn't have any effect on the professionals in the intelligence business, and there's no ideological problem in our country. Our American intelligence difficulties have been with people who wanted to make money. They were greedy.

POVICH: Is that surprising to you, that the motive for Americans to spy is one of greed?

CLINE: It's not surprising, but it is something that didn't happen in the first generation of intelligence activity in our country. In fact, we have been remarkably free from any high-level penetrations.

POVICH: You never believed the mole theories in terms of...

CLINE: I don't believe the mole theory, although you always have to look for the moles. They you probably won't find them.

I believe that our intelligence system was built on the experience of World War II and the Korean War, and it recruited a generation of people who created the CIA.

POVICH: The old OSS people.

CLINE: The old OSS crowd. Bill Casey was one of them. I was one of them. And we really had tremendously high morale and no sense of trying to achieve personal satisfaction. We felt that something important was being done in intelligence.

So this Walker case indicates that that system can be penetrated. But it was not the intelligence agencies that were penetrated, it was the military services.

POVICH: On the part of the Soviets, you feel that because there have been four leaders, let's say, in the past five years, six years in the Soviet Union, that turmoil has...

CLINE: My feeling is that the change of leadership, and

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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/26 : CIA-RDP91-00587R000100230038-7

even a generational change in the leadership of the Soviet Union, has caused a good bit of uncertainty and doubt as to where the Soviet Union is going inside the Soviet Union. Now, it'll probably keep going about the same place it always goes, but the individuals concerned naturally are concerned about their futures. And once one intelligence officer makes a break, then he jeopardizes others.

The last time we saw a number of defections in the Soviet Union of this high a caliber, or something comparable, was way back when Beria was shot, after the death of Stalin. There hasn't been anything quite of this scale since.

So, something we don't understand very well is going on in Moscow.

POVICH: Well, then let's turn to Mr. Levchenko.

Let's talk about why you decided to leave your country and, in fact, in effect, leave your loyalty, Mr. Levchenko. What brought you to it?

STANISLAV LEVCHENKO: [Inaudible]...quite long road. Probably the length of it was about 20 years, when I went through all kinds of soul-searching processes. And I was exposed to many things in the Soviet Union which even -- to which many Soviets are not exposed, themselves. And most of these things were very negative, so they opened my eyes on quite interesting parts of the teaching of the Soviet Politburo, especially the way they are influencing and manipulating the foreign Free World public opinion.

So, finally I came to the point when I not only could stand it -- could not stand it anymore, but I wanted to fight it. And, you know, in my position of KGB major, you know, you can't really fight that organization from within. You just disappear in the first few days. So that is why I decided to ask the U.S. Government for political asylum and to lead very productive and active life here, which is exactly what I do now.

POVICH: Were you helped at all? In other words, did you do this on your own? Did you just walk in and say, "I want to defect?" Or were you helped? Did you have to throw some signs out?

LEVCHENKO: I did it entirely on my own. And I personally will never forget is that I got political asylum, a decision on political asylum within six hours I asked for it. And it was late night, Washington time. So I suppose quite a few people were probably wakened up.

POVICH: Did you have to promise the United States

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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/26 : CIA-RDP91-00587R000100230038-7

While, for instance, when we're speaking about the Western countries' intelligence services, or counterintelligence services, people working there, they are working in the interests of the democracy, of the good guys.

So, those people who don't want to be bad guys anymore, who don't want to be bad guys themselves, you know, they can't stand it anymore and reach the point that they want to defect, as you call it, they ask for political asylum.

CLINE: So when Mr. Levchenko wants to join the good guys, we're delighted. And I didn't have anything to do with it. I was already retired from government. But I'm sure the pattern of giving him an opportunity to help the United States, because he had made that decision, is the right pattern.

POVICH: Let me ask Mr. Levchenko here -- we were talking about morality. If morality, in effect, in terms of your Christian ethic, over a period of years led you to leave the Soviet Union, now you're going to be helpful to the United States, let's say you mention some people that are with the KGB, or something like that, and then they get into trouble. I mean aren't you -- morality can exist on all sides of this issue, can it not?

LEVCHENKO: You know, you can't be ideal person throughout every situation of your life. However, you know, if you want to go into all, I mean, this intricate parts of the thing, I can tell you that since probably about 20 years, you know, if somebody in the Soviet KGB, for instance, gets exposed, he is not fired just for this thing, he's not thrown out, and he's not going into gulag just for that.

POVICH: He's not?

LEVCHENKO: No, no, no.

So, I cannot say that their career -- career-wise, you know, people don't have setbacks. Of course they have. No doubt about that. But at the same time, believe me, you won't find too many good guys in KGB at all, to begin with.

POVICH: I was going to ask you that. Were you an -- you must have been an exception.

LEVCHENKO: I was part of minority. Yes.

POVICH: How many people, for instance, in the KGB do you think have a feeling of the Christian moral ethic the way you did?

LEVCHENKO: I think minority does have, and they keep

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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/26 : CIA-RDP91-00587R000100230038-7

Government that you would be cooperative in answering their questions?

LEVCHENKO: No, there were no conditions attached to that at all.

POVICH: None?

LEVCHENKO: No conditions. None. No conditions. And it is very important...

POVICH: Isn't that unique? I mean we don't seem to...

LEVCHENKO: I don't think U.S. Government attaches any conditions to the Soviet officials who ask for political asylum. I don't think so. I never heard about that. I think there are no conditions.

POVICH: Let me ask Dr. Cline.

CLINE: I think not. If a Soviet national, particularly a well-informed person like an intelligence officer, wants to defect to a free society, we make the judgment on whether he is sincere and whether he has information that would be of use to our national security.

POVICH: Wait a second. This seems very polite and mannerly. Are you -- well, then, Mr. Levchenko, let me ask you this. You have been helpful to the United States Government, have you not?

LEVCHENKO: Yes, I was. But by all means, it was not a part of some kind of...

POVICH: Did you feel an obligation?

LEVCHENKO: Sorry?

POVICH: Did you feel an obligation to be helpful?

LEVCHENKO: Yes. I felt moral obligation.

You know, back to your question. You mentioned the problem of loyalty. You know, unfortunately, not too many people understand the very big difference, you know. For instance, the KGB, which is the elite in the Soviet Union, they are working for the organization which is the main pillar upon which totalitarian dictatorship, you know, rests in the Soviet Union. And they are working actually -- it is bizarre, of course, but they're working against the interests of their own people, for the interests of Politburo.

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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/26 : CIA-RDP91-00587R000100230038-7

it, of course, just a secret for themselves. Because if they will make it more or less public within the KGB, they're out immediately.

POVICH: Let me ask you, then, Mr. Levchenko, what would precipitate a KGB agent from becoming -- for becoming a double agent? In other words, why would they -- I mean Dr. Cline has talked about greed, apparently, on the part of some Americans to become, in effect, traitors. What is the reason behind some of those in the Soviet Union who act as spies for the United States? What motives?

LEVCHENKO: Primarily, I would say, what is called ideological reason. Because like, for instance, the famous historical case with Colonel Penkovsky in 1960s, who was [unintelligible] Soviets, who was working for Western intelligence services. He was doing this thing primarily for ideological reasons. He knew, undoubtedly, that his end would be quite close, and he faced that end as a man. And quite a variety of people, you know, are choosing this cooperation with Western services for ideological reasons.

However, of course, you know, in intelligence business you recruit people for a variety of reasons, you know. But primarily, speaking about the Soviet agents, I would bet that most of them are working for ideological reasons.

POVICH: Okay. We'll continue with this, Dr. Cline, because I want to ask you about that. For instance, I want to know if they're paid. Do they get some money out of the United States the way, apparently, American spies are getting them from the Soviet Union?

* * *

POVICH: What about your family, Mr. Levchenko? Did you -- were you able to secure any security for them? Were you able to get them any security, or are they still in the Soviet Union? And what's happened to them?

LEVCHENKO: The KGB is trying to prevent defections by two main things. One is threat to your life. They kind of plant the rumors that anybody who will defect from the KGB, sooner or later, you know, will be annihilated.

But the other thing is the threat against your family members which are left behind. And it is true that they are persecuted in a quite ruthless way.

I practically was separated with my wife. But even regardless of this thing, KGB quite ruthlessly persecuted her for

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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/26 : CIA-RDP91-00587R000100230038-7

two years afterwards. And they were trying to use the correspondence with me to influence me, to make me feel desperate, something like that.

POVICH: So that you would go back.

LEVCHENKO: Yeah. I have the whole collection of KGB letters which came out from Moscow which can show, you know, how skillful, actually, they -- they're trying to utilize every possible weak point in your heart, you know, to make you feel desperate.

POVICH: Right.

Do you have any reaction to what is going on today? Dr. Cline was talking about many, in terms of the Russians and Soviets, the turmoil in terms of leadership, both at the KGB over the last few years and the central leadership in Moscow.

LEVCHENKO: Yes. There are a variety of reasons to that. Change of leadership, of course, one of them. However, I do not think that it's really main one, because it is not as dramatic change of leadership as it was after Stalin, you know, when some people literally risked their life [unintelligible] with Beria trial and things like that.

What is going on is that since the beginning of Mr. Brezhnev's rule in the Soviet Union, the morals in the Soviet elite, if you want, in the higher-level government people, and of course in KGB, started to deteriorate. Corruption started to grow. And basically, people started to lose a sense of what will happen in future, really, you know, whether it will be positive or negative. And the honest minority, of course, started to go through all these motions of trying to figure out for themselves what is it, you know, right and wrong, you know, and what is it they want to do throughout the rest of their lives.

And this kind of thing, I think, was probably very major factor in bringing Mr. Gordievski, some years ago, and Mr. Yurchenko, I would assume, and possible future defector. That's what probably brought them to decision which they finally made, to ask for political asylum.

On the other hand, I think that, you know, intelligence business is very intricate thing. And when you put some investment in something there, you know, it pays only in many years' time, you know. And I think that probably sometime in 1960s American intelligence community did make certain investment in...

POVICH: Were able to penetrate the KGB, in terms of getting some agents to...

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/26 : CIA-RDP91-00587R000100230038-7

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/26 : CIA-RDP91-00587R000100230038-7

LEVCHENKO: I don't mean that. I don't know about that. What I mean, however, that it created that investment in 1960s, you know, probably in manpower, in methods, and things like that, probably now started to pay in the sense that Western intelligence community understands defectors better, or probably is able to recruit certain people who can meaningfully cooperate with Western intelligence services.

POVICH: Let's talk to Dr. Cline about that.

CLINE: Well, I think Mr. Levchenko's remarks are very relevant about the difference between the two systems. There, you're getting corruption and disillusionment at the top of the system. Here, you're getting low-level people who are greedy. Quite a different situation, reflecting our two societies.

The defectors from the Soviet Union, the KGB that I have personally had something to do with were partly driven by personal circumstances. And the best...

POVICH: These are like the Penkovskys.

CLINE: Yes. They have a problem of establishing their identity in a drab and corrupt system of society.

But occasionally -- you asked me if they liked money. Sure, some of them do. Usually they have to keep it outside the Soviet Union in an escrow account so they can't show it. It doesn't mean so much.

The defector whom I knew the best came out somewhat under my supervision. He was a man named Runna (?), an illegal who had been in West Germany for 12 years under cover. We got him out because we brought his wife and child with him. And that was the best enticement you could give.

So, every case is a personal case. You have to find what will help. But basically, you come back to the fact that we have an advantage in dealing with the KGB because it is such a ruthless and bureaucratic model of totalitarian life.

POVICH: Well, although there's -- the story in Newsweek this week is saying that there's lots of concern now in the White House, for instance, about even this low-level CIA employee named Howard.

CLINE: Little Howard? Well, Howard wasn't...

POVICH: And they want a shakeup and they want the CIA turned upside-down, let's plug up the leaks.

CLINE: Maury, I've been in this town 40 years, and

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anything that happens related to intelligence ends up with a demand for shaking up CIA. CIA's the favorite whipping boy of this city, I'm afraid.

I don't think the Howard case was a very important one. The man was trained. He was never dispatched on an operation. He undoubtedly knows and will assist the Soviet Union, if he goes there, which I expect, in detailed matters which they're already pretty well informed about.

POVICH: Although he did close down one agent for us who apparently had been working in the Soviet Union, and he was not allowed to...

CLINE: I'm sure we have lost one or two agents. But that's probably the extent of this man's knowledge. Whereas a man like Gordievski or Yurchenko will be debriefed for three or four years and will continue to dredge up detailed information which will enable other leads to be pursued.

POVICH: Mr. Levchenko, Mr. Yurchenko and Mr. Gordievski, they are considered very important people for the United States, in terms of their defections?

LEVCHENKO: Of course I think so. Because, you know, Mr. Gordievski was no less...

POVICH: This was the man in Britain.

LEVCHENKO: ...chief of station of the KGB in Britain. And Britain is probably number three target for the Soviet intelligence, after the United States and People's Republic of China. So you can imagine what kind of importance he had for KGB, and probably, I hope, now has importance for American intelligence community.

Mr. Yurchenko also, it looks like...

POVICH: He was the one who defected in Italy, I think.

LEVCHENKO: Yes. He also was a very senior person, undoubtedly exposed to very serious information within the KGB.

POVICH: What do you think is going on now in the KGB, in terms of...

LEVCHENKO: I think that Director of the First Directorate, which is the name of the KGB external intellgience, General Krishkov (?), is writing now last papers in his career, and then he will be probably fired.

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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/26 : CIA-RDP91-00587R000100230038-7

Speaking about Chebrikov, chief of the whole KGB, I think he will be still there. He is member of Politburo. He is above punishment.

And undoubtedly so, KGB intelligence will have to go through all kinds of restucturing and all kinds of really shakeups, which will take some years, probably.

POVICH: You fear, still, do you not, for your safety?

LEVCHENKO: You know...

POVICH: You're obviously not showing your face.

LEVCHENKO: Well, I am reasonably cautious, you know. I am very active, and many people know how active I am. And let's put it this way: I'm like soldier, because, you know, if you're in combat situation and if you're turning your head backwards all the time, you won't really succeed in anything.

So, you know, I'm not scared, I'm not -- I'm never in panic and things like that. Sometimes I'm reasonably cautious, like [unintelligible] on TV.

POVICH: I understand.

Do you still have help from the United States? Have you ever asked for any help or assistance in terms of your safety?

LEVCHENKO: Let me not comment on this thing, but I am very happy with what I'm doing and with the way of my life...

POVICH: That's what I was trying to get at. As you envisioned it when you decided to come to this country, I mean has it lived up to your expectations?

LEVCHENKO: Yes, yes. Undoubtedly so.

CLINE: And Maury, let us conclude by saying that is why we get KGB people to come to this country. We have a better country. We treat people with some respect for their humanity and...

POVICH: Where do you think Mr. Howard, for instance, the former CIA employee who apparently, or the reports are, is in Moscow...

CLINE: I do not envy Mr. Howard at all. He will be milked for publicity, for propaganda, and any minor pieces of information he has; then he will become a nonentity.

POVICH: Is that what happens to those who defect from

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the West to Russia?

CLINE: They are played up as great assets, but they are in fact forced to live a very restricted, and usually unhappy, life. I wouldn't be surprised if Mr. Howard is trying to redefect within two years.

POVICH: I thank you so much....

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